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Widespread belief in misinformation circulating online is a crit-
ical challenge for modern societies. While research to date has
focused on psychological and political antecedents to this phe-
nomenon, few studies have explored the role of digital media
literacy shortfalls. Using data from preregistered survey exper-
iments conducted around recent elections in the United States
and India, we assess the effectiveness of an intervention modeled
closely on the world’s largest media literacy campaign, which pro-
vided “tips” on how to spot false news to people in 14 countries.
Our results indicate that exposure to this intervention reduced
the perceived accuracy of both mainstream and false news head-
lines, but effects on the latter were significantly larger. As a result,
the intervention improved discernment between mainstream and
false news headlines among both a nationally representative sam-
ple in the United States (by 26.5%) and a highly educated online
sample in India (by 17.5%). This increase in discernment remained
measurable several weeks later in the United States (but not in
India). However, we find no effects among a representative sam-
ple of respondents in a largely rural area of northern India, where
rates of social media use are far lower.
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Social media platforms have proved to be fertile ground forinflammatory political misinformation. People around the
world increasingly worry that so-called “fake news” and other
forms of dubious or false information are misleading voters—a
fear that has inspired government actions to address the problem
in a number of countries (1, 2).
Research into online misinformation has thus far focused on
political, economic, and psychological factors (3–5). In this arti-
cle, we focus on another human vulnerability to online political
misinformation: shortfalls in digital media literacy.
While largely overlooked in the emerging empirical litera-
ture on digital disinformation and fake news, the concept of
digital media literacy usefully captures the skills and competen-
cies needed to successfully navigate a fragmented and complex
information ecosystem (6). Even under ideal conditions, most
people struggle to reliably evaluate the quality of information
they encounter online because they lack the skills and contex-
tual knowledge required to effectively distinguish between high-
and low-quality news content.
The connection between digital media literacy and misinfor-
mation was identified early by theorists. “Misinformation—and
disinformation—breeds as easily as creativity in the fever-swamp
of personal publishing,” according to an influential 1997 intro-
duction to the subject. “It will take all of the critical skills users
can muster to separate truth from fiction” (ref. 7, p. xii).
More than 20 y later, these warnings seem prescient. Sur-
vey research shows that few people are prepared to effectively
navigate the digital world. For example, the Pew Research Cen-
ter found as recently as 2017 that only 17% of US adults have
the skills and confidence to learn new information effectively
online (8). Nonetheless, people worldwide increasingly obtain
news and information from social media platforms that lack tra-
ditional editorial controls (9, 10), allowing politicians and other
actors to widely disseminate misinformation via algorithmic news
feeds. Without the necessary digital media literacy skills, people
frequently fall victim to dubious claims they encounter in this
context.
These concerns have become especially salient in the United
States and India in recent years. In the United States, low-
quality online articles were distributed widely on social media in
the months before the 2016 US presidential election (11). This
phenomenon created widespread fears that fake news was mis-
leading people at a massive scale (12). Smartphone use has also
made India, the world’s largest democracy, a fertile environment
for online rumors and misinformation. Viral misinformation
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spread via WhatsApp in India has reportedly provoked hatred
and ethnic violence (13). Moreover, online political misinforma-
tion became a significant concern during the 2019 Indian general
election as political parties engaged in aggressive digital cam-
paign efforts via short message service (SMS) and messaging
applications like WhatsApp (14, 15). For instance, one analy-
sis found that over 25% of the news shared on Facebook during
the election by the governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came
from dubious outlets (16).
Many nonprofits and governments are seeking to counter
these trends (and the related threat of foreign manipulation
campaigns) by improving the digital media literacy of news con-
sumers (17–20). For instance, American universities increasingly
teach media literacy to undergraduate students (21) and similar
efforts are also being proposed at the kindergarten to grade 12
(22). Similarly, WhatsApp and the National Association of Soft-
ware and Service Companies announced plans to train nearly
100,000 people in India through in-person events and posts on
social media to spot misinformation (23).
Despite the attention and resources these initiatives have
received, however, little large-scale evidence exists on the effec-
tiveness of promoting digital media literacy as a response to
online misinformation. Existing scholarly work related to digital
and media literacy is frequently qualitative in nature or focused
on specific subpopulations and/or issues. Observational find-
ings are mixed (24, 25) and randomized controlled trials remain
rare (26).
Two related but more specific approaches have been shown
to be somewhat effective in countering misinformation and
are important to note, however. First, inoculation interventions
have been employed to protect audiences against misleading
content by warning of misinformation and either correcting spe-
cific false claims or identifying tactics used to promote it. This
approach has been shown to reduce the persuasiveness of misin-
formation in specific domains (27–32). In addition, other studies
evaluate the effectiveness of providing warnings about specific
misinformation (33, 34).
We therefore seek to determine whether efforts to promote
digital media literacy can improve respondents’ ability to cor-
rectly evaluate the accuracy of online content across issues. Such
a finding would suggest that digital media literacy shortfalls are
a key factor in why people fall victim to misinformation. In par-
ticular, we consider the effects of exposure to Facebook’s “Tips
to Spot False News,” which were developed in collaboration with
the nonprofit First Draft and subsequently promoted at the top
of users’ news feeds in 14 countries in April 2017 and printed
in full-page newspaper advertisements in the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Mexico, and India (35–40).
A variant of these tips was later distributed by WhatsApp (a
Facebook subsidiary) in advertisements published in Indian and
Pakistani newspapers in 2018 (41, 42). These tips are therefore
almost surely the most widely disseminated digital media lit-
eracy intervention conducted to date. (The full treatments are
provided in SI Appendix, section A.) The US treatment, which
was adapted verbatim from Facebook’s campaign, consists of 10
strategies that readers can use to identify false or misleading
stories that appear on their news feeds, whereas the India treat-
ment, which uses adapted versions of messages shown in India by
Facebook and WhatsApp, presents 6.
These interventions provide simple rules that can help individ-
uals to evaluate the credibility of sources and identify indicators
of problematic content without expending significant time or
attention. For instance, one sample tip recommends that respon-
dents “[b]e skeptical of headlines,” warning that “If shocking
claims in the headline sound unbelievable, they probably are.”
Such an approach should reduce reliance on low-effort processes
that frequently lead people astray (e.g., perceptions of cognitive
fluency) by teaching people more effective heuristics (e.g., skep-
ticism toward catchy headlines). Importantly, the success of this
approach does not require readers to take burdensome steps like
conducting research or thinking deeply about each piece of news
they encounter (which is typically impossible in practice given
the volume of stories that social media users encounter). Instead,
this intervention aims to provide simple decision rules that help
people distinguish between mainstream and false news, which we
call “discernment” following ref. 4.
There are important reasons to be skeptical about the effec-
tiveness of this approach. Prior research has found that media
literacy interventions like this can help people think critically
about the media content they receive (43). However, prior stud-
ies focus mostly on offline health behavior; the extent to which
these interventions are effective for controversial political claims
or online (mis)information is largely unknown. Moreover, such
interventions may struggle to overcome people’s reliance on
heuristics such as familiarity and congeniality that news con-
sumers use to evaluate the credibility of online stories (44, 45).
Finally, attempting to identify false news through close scrutiny
of a headline differs from the typical approach of professional
fact checkers, who usually use “lateral reading” of alternative
sources to corroborate claims (46).
We therefore conducted preregistered survey experiments in
both the United States and India examining the effectiveness
of presenting people with “tips” to help spot false news sto-
ries. [The US and India studies were each preregistered with
Evidence in Governance and Politics; see Materials and Meth-
ods. All preregistered analyses are reported in this article or in
the replication archive for the study (47).] Strikingly, our results
indicate that exposure to variants of the Facebook media liter-
acy intervention reduces people’s belief in false headlines. These
effects are not only an artifact of greater skepticism toward all
information—although the perceived accuracy of mainstream
news headlines slightly decreased, exposure to the intervention
widened the gap in perceived accuracy between mainstream and
false news headlines overall. In the United States, the effects
of the treatment were particularly strong and remained statis-
tically measurable after a delay of approximately 3 wk. These
findings suggest that efforts to promote digital media literacy can
improve people’s ability to distinguish between false and main-
stream news content, a result with important implications for
both scientific research into why people believe misinformation
online and policies designed to address the problem.
Our main research hypotheses evaluate whether the media
literacy intervention reduces belief in false news stories (hypoth-
esis 1 [H1]), increases belief in mainstream news content (H2),
and improves respondents’ ability to distinguish between them
(H3). We also consider three research questions (RQs) for which
our a priori expectations were less clear. First, past research
shows that the effects of many experimental treatments (e.g., in
persuasion and framing studies) decay quickly over time (48),
although providing participants with novel information may have
more long-lasting effects (49). We therefore test the durability
of our treatment effect by leveraging a two-wave panel design
to tests its effects several weeks after the initial intervention
(RQ1). Second, it is also possible that interventions may work
only to make individuals more skeptical of noncongenial content
they are already inclined to dismiss, leaving their vulnerability
to ideologically consistent misinformation unchanged. We there-
fore test for the heterogeneity of the treatment effects based
on the partisan congeniality of the content (RQ2). Finally, we
test whether the intervention changed self-reported intentions
to share false stories or subsequent online news consumption
behavior in the US sample where these measures were available
(RQ3). Additional analyses exploring heterogenous treatment
effects and alternate outcomes are discussed below, but full mod-
els appear in SI Appendix, section C. These analyses include
whether intuitive cognitive style or prior headline exposure









































moderates the treatment effect, as well as whether the treatment
affects the perceived credibility of “hyperpartisan” headlines.
Results
US Survey Experiment. Consistent with our first hypothesis (H1),
randomized exposure to the media literacy intervention causes a
decrease in the perceived accuracy of false news articles. Results
from wave 1 of the US study in Table 1 show a decrease of nearly
0.2 points on a 4-point scale (intent to treat [ITT]: β=−0.196,
SE=0.020; P < 0.005). We observe similar effects of the media
literacy intervention on the perceived accuracy of hyperpar-
tisan headlines (ITT: β=−0.176, SE=0.020; P < 0.005) (SI
Appendix, section C, Table C2).
One concern is that the intent-to-treat effects described above
understate the true effect of the intervention, which may have
been neglected by some respondents. While we can offer the
opportunity to read the digital literacy “fake news tips” interven-
tion to a random subset of respondents, we cannot force every
respondent to read these tips carefully.
We therefore also estimate the effect of the treatment on those
who actually received it, which is known as the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT), using an instrumental variables
approach. In this model, our indicator for receipt of treatment
is the ability to correctly answer a series of follow-up questions
about the content of the news tips (approximately two-thirds of
respondents in the treatment condition [66%] were successfully
treated) and our instrument is the original random assignment.
Table 1 reports the ATT, which we compute using two-stage
least-squares regression. With this approach, we estimate that
the perceived accuracy of false headlines decreased by nearly
0.3 points on a 4-point scale (ATT: β=−0.299, SE=0.030;
P < 0.005).†
We compare the characteristics of respondents who would suc-
cessfully take the treatment only if assigned to it (“compliers”)
to those who would not even if assigned to treatment (“never tak-
ers”) (SI Appendix, section B) (50). Compliers were more likely
to be older, college graduates, interested in politics, politically
knowledgeable, Republican identifiers, and more polarized in
their feelings toward the two political parties than never tak-
ers. Compliers also scored lower in conspiracy predispositions
and their feelings toward Donald Trump. However, the sub-
stantive magnitudes of most of these differences are modest (SI
Appendix, section B, Fig. B1). Crucially, we find no statistically
significant evidence that respondents who take the treatment dif-
fer in their baseline propensity to visit untrustworthy websites
compared to those who do not (analysis conducted among par-
ticipants for whom presurvey behavioral data are available; see
SI Appendix, section A for details). The average number of prior
visits to false news websites is actually greater among compliers
than among never takers but this difference does not reach con-
ventional thresholds of statistical significance (0.35 compared to
0.18; P =0.08).
Our next hypotheses predicted that the media literacy inter-
vention would increase the perceived accuracy of mainstream
news (H2) and increase people’s ability to successfully distin-
guish between mainstream and false news articles (H3). These
results are shown in the second and third columns in Table 1.
We find that exposure to the media literacy intervention had
a small negative effect on belief in mainstream news in wave
1 (ITT, β=−0.046 [SE=0.017], P < 0.01; ATT, β=−0.071
[SE=0.026], P < 0.01). However, the negative effects of the
†These results were not preregistered but were estimated to match the preregistered
compliance analyses reported in the India study. We also provide additional exploratory
results that instead define compliance as answering each comprehension question cor-
rectly by the third try in SI Appendix, section C, Table C7. Our ATT effect estimates are
necessarily smaller using this less stringent definition of treatment uptake.
Table 1. Effect of US media literacy intervention on perceived








Headline fixed effects X X
N (headlines) 9,813 19,623
N (respondents) 4,907 4,907 4,907
ATT




Headline fixed effects X X
N (headlines) 9,813 19,623
N (respondents) 4,907 4,907 4,907
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.005 (two-sided). Data are from wave 1
(November to December 2018). Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS)
or two-stage least-squares coefficients with robust standard errors in paren-
theses (clustered by respondent for false and mainstream news accuracy).
Dependent variables for perceived false and mainstream news accuracy are
measured on a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 represents “not at all accurate” and
4 represents “very accurate.” The dependent variable for the difference in
perceived false versus mainstream news accuracy is calculated at the respon-
dent level as the mean difference in perceived accuracy between all false
and all mainstream news headlines viewed.
intervention on the perceived accuracy of false news described
above are larger. As a result, the media literacy intervention
increased discernment between mainstream and false stories
(ITT, β=0.146 [SE=0.024], P < 0.005; ATT, β=0.223 [SE=
0.035], P < 0.005), demonstrating that it helped respondents to
better distinguish between these two types of content. In relative
terms, this effect represents a 26.5% improvement in respon-
dents’ ability to distinguish between mainstream and false news
stories compared to the control condition.
In addition, we test the durability of these treatment effects
in wave 2 per RQ1. After a delay between waves that aver-
aged several weeks, the effect of the media literacy inter-
vention on the perceived accuracy of false headlines remains
statistically distinguishable from zero (SI Appendix, section C,
Table C1). The median interval between waves was 20 d; the
5th to 95th percentile range was 16 to 29 d. While the effect
is still present weeks later, its magnitude attenuates by more
than half relative to wave 1 (ITT, β=−0.080 [SE=0.019],
P < 0.005; ATT, β=−0.121 [SE=0.028], P < 0.005). In addi-
tion, the negative effect of the media literacy treatment on
the perceived accuracy of mainstream news content was no
longer statistically measurable by wave 2. As a result, the
perceived accuracy difference between mainstream and false
headlines remained statistically distinguishable from zero in the
second wave, although its magnitude decayed (β=0.050; SE=
0.020; P < 0.05).
Fig. 1 illustrates the substantive magnitude of the intent to
treat effects of the media literacy intervention in the United
States using a binary indicator of perceived headline accuracy.
The proportion of respondents rating a false headline as “very
accurate” or “somewhat accurate” decreased from 32% in the
control condition to 24% among respondents who were assigned
to the media literacy intervention in wave 1, a decrease of 7
percentage points. This effect represents a relative decrease of
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Fig. 1. Percentage of US respondents rating false and mainstream news headlines as somewhat accurate or very accurate. Respondents rated two and four
headlines, respectively, in wave 1 and four and eight headlines, respectively, in wave 2. Headlines were selected randomly in wave 1, balanced by partisan
congeniality, and presented in random order. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals of the mean.
approximately one-fourth in the percentage of people wrongly
endorsing misinformation. Treatment effects continue to persist
with this alternate measure—in wave 2, the intervention reduced
the proportion of people endorsing false headlines as accurate
from 33 to 29%, a 4-percentage-point effect. By contrast, the pro-
portion of respondents who classified mainstream news as not
very accurate or not at all accurate rather than somewhat or very
accurate decreased only from 57 to 55% in wave 1 and 59 to 57%
in wave 2.
Finally, RQ2 explores whether the effects of the media literacy
intervention are moderated by the partisan congeniality of the
headlines people rated. We find no consistent evidence that the
effects of media literacy intervention are moderated by conge-
niality (SI Appendix, section C). In other words, the effects of the
intervention were not differentially concentrated among head-
lines that were uncongenial to respondents—an encouraging null
result that echoes findings in recent studies (34, 51, 52).
Additional results reported in SI Appendix, section C indi-
cate that we have insufficient evidence to conclude that the
intervention had an effect on self-reported intention to share
false news or behavioral measures of news consumption (SI
Appendix, section C, Table C13). However, the intervention did
significantly increase sharing intentions for mainstream news and
decrease sharing intentions for hyperpartisan news. This is con-
sistent with previous studies that have reported mixed effects of
warning labels on sharing intent (33, 34). The mixed results we
observe for sharing intent may be attributable to the fact that
belief accuracy questions appeared immediately before the shar-
ing intent questions in the survey, which may prime accuracy
concerns among respondents and thereby alter both real and
self-reported sharing behavior. In addition, we find no measur-
able effect of the intervention on posttreatment visits to false
news, mainstream news, or fact-checking sites, although these
effects can be estimated only among the subset of respondents
for whom we have behavioral data (SI Appendix, section C,
Tables C14–15).
India Survey Experiments. As detailed in Materials and Methods,
we conducted separate online and face-to-face surveys in India of
different populations. For the online sample, we again find sup-
port for H1. The media literacy treatment significantly reduced
beliefs in false news stories (ITT: β=−0.126, SE = 0.026;
P < 0.005) in the first wave of a two-wave survey (Table 2).
As with the US analysis, the ATT estimate was substantially
larger (Table 2), although the difference between the ITT and
the ATT is larger for the Indian analysis because fewer respon-
dents answered all comprehension checks correctly in the Indian
sample (28% in the online sample versus 66% in the United
States).‡ Respondents to the online survey who received the
treatment were nearly half of a response category more skeptical
of false news stories (ATT: β=−0.470, SE = 0.097; P < 0.005).
As in the United States, we also find no support for H2,
which predicted that exposure to the treatment would increase
the perceived accuracy of mainstream news. Instead, the per-
ceived accuracy of mainstream news decreased, although by less
than the effect observed for false news (ITT, β=−0.071 [SE =
0.025], P < 0.01; ATT, β=−0.259 [SE = 0.095], P < 0.01).
Results again mirror the US study for H3—respondents bet-
ter distinguished between mainstream and false articles (ITT,
β=0.063 [SE = 0.025], P < 0.05; ATT, β=0.221 [SE = 0.088],
P < 0.05).§ While the magnitude of this effect is lower than for
the US sample, it translates to a 17.3% improvement in dis-
cernment between mainstream and false news relative to the
difference observed in the control condition. As we discuss in
more detail below, treatment effects cannot be distinguished
from zero in the second wave (RQ1).
While the analyses of the online samples from the United
States and India show substantially similar results, results from
the face-to-face survey in India differ in important ways. As
shown in Table 2, we find no evidence that the treatment
increased the perceived accuracy of mainstream news articles
as predicted by H2. However, it did not reduce the perceived
accuracy of these headlines either as we found in the United
States and online studies. In addition, unlike the other studies,
we find no evidence that the media literacy treatment system-
atically affected beliefs in false news stories (H1) or discrimi-
nation between false and mainstream news (H3) among India
face-to-face respondents.
‡The analysis of compliers is presented in SI Appendix, section B. As SI Appendix, Fig. B2
shows, compliers in the India online sample (those who would take the treatment if
assigned) were more likely to be young, male, Hindu, and high caste; to have graduated
from college; to use WhatsApp; and to have more political knowledge and interest than
never takers (respondents who would not take the treatment if assigned to receive it).
We find no significant differences between these groups in the face-to-face sample (SI
Appendix, section B, Fig. B3).
§In an exploratory analysis, we show that the result is robust to using an indicator for
false news headlines instead of headline fixed effects (SI Appendix, section D, Table D3).









































Table 2. Effect of India media literacy intervention on perceived accuracy by news type
Online sample Face-to-face sample
False news Mainstream news Mainstream−false False news Mainstream news Mainstream−false
ITT effects
Media literacy intervention −0.126*** −0.071** 0.063* −0.007 0.002 0.006
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030)
Constant 0.361*** 0.237***
(0.017) (0.021)
Headline fixed effects X X X X
N (headlines) 17,031 17,163 13,712 13,969
N (respondents) 3,177 3,182 3,160 3,267 3,314 3,140
ATT
Media literacy intervention −0.470*** −0.259** 0.221* −0.035 0.011 0.028
(0.097) (0.095) (0.088) (0.113) (0.113) (0.138)
Constant 0.361*** 0.237***
(0.017) (0.021)
Headline fixed effects X X X X
N (headlines) 17,031 17,163 13,712 13,969
N (respondents) 3,177 3,182 3,160 3,267 3,314 3,140
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.005 (two-sided). Data are from wave 1 (April to May 2019). Cell entries are OLS or two-stage least-squares coefficients
with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by respondent for false and mainstream news accuracy). Dependent variables for perceived false and
mainstream news accuracy are measured on a 1 to 4 scale where 1 represents “Not at all accurate” and 4 represents “Very accurate.” The dependent variable
for the difference in perceived false versus mainstream news accuracy is calculated at the respondent level as the mean difference in perceived accuracy
between all false and all mainstream news headlines viewed.
We directly assess the difference between the two samples
using a pooled model. These results, presented in SI Appendix,
section D, Table D13, indicate that we can reject the null of
no difference in media literacy intervention effects between
the face-to-face and online samples for ratings of false news
(ITT estimate of the face-to-face − online difference, β=0.118
[SE = 0.035], P < 0.005; ATT, β=0.428 [SE = 0.149], P <
0.005) and for the ITT estimate for ratings of mainstream
news stories (ITT, β=0.072 [SE=0.035], P < 0.05; ATT, β=
0.266 [SE=0.148], P > 0.05), but not for the average difference
in perceived accuracy between mainstream and false news stories
(ITT, β=−0.057 [SE = 0.039], P > 0.05; ATT, β=−0.194 [SE
= 0.163], P > 0.05). Potentially, the differences in our results
between studies may reflect the different survey modes or demo-
graphic compositions of the samples (we consider this issue
further in Discussion).
Fig. 2 illustrates the substantive magnitudes of the ITT effect
for respondents to the two India surveys. For the online survey,
exposure to the media literacy intervention reduced the percent-
age of respondents rating false headlines as somewhat accurate
or very accurate from 49% in the control group to 44% in the
treatment group, a decrease of approximately 10% in relative
terms. As noted above, the effect of the intervention was much
greater for those who received the treatment successfully—the
ATT estimate indicates a decline of approximately 19 percent-
age points in endorsement of false headlines among this group
(SI Appendix, section D, Table D7). By contrast, although main-
stream stories were also viewed more skeptically by online survey
respondents who received the media literacy intervention (from
63% for controls to 60% in the treatment group), the rela-
tive decrease in perceived accuracy was only half of what was
observed for false headlines. Finally, as noted above, there was
no significant difference on average between face-to-face survey
respondents who received the media literacy treatment and those
who did not for either false or mainstream headlines (belief lev-
els were higher overall among face-to-face respondents—62%
for false headlines and 72% for mainstream headlines).
A key research question was whether any treatment effects
would persist over time (RQ1). We found no statistically reliable
evidence that the treatment affected headline accuracy ratings
among wave 2 respondents in either India sample (SI Appendix,
section D, Table D2).¶ Finally, we did not find statistically reli-
able evidence in either India survey that the media literacy
intervention’s effects were moderated by partisan congeniality
(RQ2; SI Appendix, section D, Table D9). We cannot conclude
that the effects we observe depend on whether the headlines
were congenial to respondent partisanship.
Discussion
Comparing our results across studies reveals a relatively con-
sistent pattern. As Fig. 3 indicates, both the US study and the
India online study find negative effects on the perceived accu-
racy of false headlines that are diminished for mainstream news
headlines. As a result, respondents’ ability to discern between
mainstream and false news increased. Although these findings
are not observed in the India face-to-face study, a combined
estimate pooling data from all three studies replicates the over-
all pattern of reduced false news accuracy perceptions and
increased discernment between mainstream and false news. The
treatment effect estimates for each study as well as the pooled
results are shown in Fig. 3 (see SI Appendix, section F for full
model results).
These effects are also substantively meaningful. Although our
study does not instruct respondents to apply the lessons from
the intervention to the headline ratings task, the effect sizes are
comparable to the estimated effect of exposure to the labels
Facebook initially used to indicate that articles were disputed
by fact checkers (ITT estimate: β=−0.236, SE=0.036; P <
0.005) (34) and greatly exceed the effects of a general warning
about false news in the same study (ITT estimate: β=−0.079,
SE=0.034; P < 0.05). A comparison of effect sizes with other
¶The median intervals between waves were 20 d for the face-to-face survey and 19 d
in the online survey; the 5th to 95th percentile ranges were 14 to 29 d and 15 to 26 d,
respectively. The wave 2 results are substantively unchanged if we include the four addi-
tional false headlines from the fact-check message experiment described in SI Appendix,
section A (SI Appendix, section D, Table D10).









































Control Media literacy intervention
Fig. 2. Percentage of India respondents rating false and mainstream news headlines as somewhat accurate or very accurate in wave 1. Respondents rated
six of each type of headline. The headlines were balanced by partisan congeniality and presented in random order. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals
of the mean.
randomized media literacy interventions in SI Appendix, section
E, Table E1 shows that our US study has the largest measured
effect size to date on ratings of false headlines (d =0.20) and
that the India online study (d =0.11) falls in the upper middle of
the distribution. Moreover, effect sizes are substantially larger
for respondents who were successfully treated with the media
literacy intervention.
Despite the strength of the combined estimates, the effec-
tiveness of the intervention varied across samples. First, the
intervention may have been more unfamiliar or difficult to
understand for Indian respondents, who successfully received
the treatment at a much lower rate than those in the United
States. Additional evidence suggests that respondents may have
applied the intervention differently. Specifically, the US data
show that the negative effects of the media literacy interven-
tion on perceived headline accuracy were greater for headlines
from untrustworthy, hyperpartisan, and unfamiliar mainstream
sources that respondents in the control group found less plausi-
ble to begin with (r =0.79; SI Appendix, section C, Table C11
and Fig. C2). This finding helps explain the observed nega-
tive effect of the media literacy intervention on the perceived
accuracy of mainstream news overall.# By contrast, no such
relationship between baseline headline accuracy and media lit-
eracy intervention effects is observed in the Indian online data
(r =−0.09; SI Appendix, section D8), suggesting respondents
became more skeptical across the board.
Problems applying the intervention may have been particularly
acute for respondents in the face-to-face sample. This group is
quite dissimilar from both the highly educated online sample
in India and the US sample on a number of important indi-
cators (SI Appendix, section B). In particular, participants in
the face-to-face study had much less experience with the task
of evaluating news headlines online—only 11% reported using
WhatsApp compared with 90% for the online sample in India.
Correspondingly, an exploratory analysis shows the effects of the
intervention were similar among WhatsApp users across sam-
ples; however, these effects are imprecisely estimated among
#An exploratory analysis of whether source prominence moderates the effects of
the media literacy intervention shows that the negative effects we observe for the
perceived accuracy of mainstream news headlines were concentrated among stories
from low-prominence sources. By contrast, we find that the intervention appeared to
increase the perceived accuracy of stories from high-prominence sources (SI Appendix,
section C9).
face-to-face participants because WhatsApp use was so rare (SI
Appendix, section D9).
Finally, we consider the potential trade-off between increased
skepticism toward false news headlines and decreased belief
in mainstream news headlines. Our results do indicate that
increased skepticism of false news headlines may come at the
expense of decreased belief in mainstream news headlines—the
media literacy intervention reduced the perceived accuracy of
these headlines in both the US and India online surveys. How-
ever, the magnitude of the decrease in the perceived accuracy
of mainstream news headlines ranges from under 25% (United
States) to just over half (India online sample) of the estimated
size of the decrease in the perceived accuracy of untrustworthy
news headlines in wave 1 of our surveys. As a result, respondents’
overall ability to distinguish between mainstream and untrust-
worthy news increases by more than 26% in the US sample and
17% in the highly educated online Indian sample. Moreover, we
observe no measurable decrease in the perceived accuracy of
mainstream news headlines in wave 2 of any of our surveys.
A related concern is that the intervention could reduce the
overall accuracy of people’s beliefs given that they typically con-
sume much more information from mainstream sources than
from untrustworthy ones (53). To address this concern, we use
US Pulse web metering data to estimate the overall change that
the intervention would hypothetically induce in people’s ability
to accurately discern credible news given exposure rates for US
participants to different types of news sources (see SI Appendix,
section G for details). Because Americans’ news consumption
is concentrated among the high-prominence mainstream out-
lets for which the intervention may have had a small positive
effect#, these calculations indicate that individuals would reach
valid accuracy beliefs for 64.6% of stories in the treatment group
compared to 62.9% in the control group. Moreover, the percent-
age of “false positives”—stories they encounter from dubious
sources and believe to be true—would decrease from 6.1%
of all stories consumed in the control group to 4.9% in the
treatment group.
Conclusion
The findings we present provide important evidence that short-
falls in digital media literacy are an important factor in why
people believe misinformation that they encounter online. We
find that a simple, scalable media literacy intervention can
decrease the perceived accuracy of false news content and help














































Fig. 3. Data are from wave 1. Effect sizes are plotted with 95% confidence
intervals. Effect sizes are estimated at the headline level for false and main-
stream news and at the respondent level for the difference in perceived
accuracy between them.
people to better distinguish it from factual mainstream news in
both the United States and India. Moreover, the improvement
in headline accuracy rating performance we observe does not
depend on whether the claims in question align with respondents’
political predispositions.
Our results further suggest that media literacy campaigns
could be an effective strategy to help counter false or mislead-
ing news, a finding with important real-world implications. Some
explanations for belief in misinformation identify factors that
resist intervention (4), while others propose policy approaches
that are effective in practice but difficult to scale (34, 44). Inoc-
ulation, while effective in preemptively refuting misinformation
in specific domains (27–30), may not improve discernment when
evaluating a diverse array of real-world news content. By con-
trast, these results show that a brief intervention which could be
inexpensively disseminated at scale can be effective at reducing
the perceived accuracy of false news stories, helping users more
accurately gauge the credibility of news content they encounter
on different topics or issues.
Although these results suggest that digital literacy interven-
tions could be a valuable tool in the fight against misinformation,
several caveats should be offered. First, the effect sizes were
modest; this simple intervention did not eliminate belief in false
news headlines. Second, the effects decayed over time (diminish-
ing in magnitude in the United States and no longer remaining
statistically measurable in the India online study), suggesting the
need for social media companies, journalists, and educators to
reinforce these lessons on a recurring basis. Third, although the
intervention improved overall discernment between mainstream
and false news headlines, it did have a small but measurable
negative effect on the perceived accuracy of mainstream news
stories. Fourth, all treated participants were exposed to the
intervention; many real-world Facebook users are likely to have
ignored the Tips to Spot False News link when the company
offered it in their feeds. (The difference between our ITT and
ATT estimates illustrates how lack of attention to the treat-
ment reduces its effectiveness.) Finally, we have insufficient
evidence to conclude that the intervention changed real-world
consumption of false news, perhaps because information habits
are ingrained and difficult to alter. However, we do find evidence
that the treatment increased respondents’ intent to share main-
stream news and decreased intent to share hyperpartisan news,
suggesting the possibility of changes to social media behavior.
Our findings also suggest a number of directions for future
research. One advantage of the study is that we used an actual
intervention deployed globally by a technology company that
has served as an important access point to false news (53).
However, scholars should conduct comparative evaluations of
the effects of different interventions rather than relying on this
model as a default and test the effectiveness of these approaches
in different samples, countries, and electoral contexts. These
evaluations should include tests of more intensive digital literacy
training models (such as the “lateral reading” approach used by
professional fact checkers), which could potentially have larger
and/or more durable effects. In addition, scholars should seek to
better understand the mechanism through which such interven-
tions operate, identifying whether the effects they observe are
due to increased accuracy concerns versus helping people learn
more effective heuristics for evaluating news content. Finally,
researchers should further examine whether and how media lit-
eracy interventions can increase the frequency or effectiveness
of accuracy-promoting behavior in social contexts. Even if these
interventions do not reach everyone, improving the media lit-
eracy of a subset of the population could yield wider positive
effects if, for instance, those who are treated help to correct the
misinformation they see on social media (54).
To our knowledge, though, these findings are the most com-
pelling demonstration to date that a real-world digital literacy
intervention can have significant and potentially lasting effects.
While efforts to improve online digital literacy are not a panacea,
they may prove to be a vital and cost-effective way to reduce
people’s vulnerability to false news and thereby improve the
information health of democracies.
Materials and Methods
Data Collection. We conducted two-wave panel surveys of respondents that
included an embedded media literacy intervention. One survey took place
in the United States and two were conducted in India. All took place dur-
ing periods of high political interest during and immediately after national
electoral campaigns.
In the United States, we conducted a two-wave online panel sur-
vey fielded by the survey company YouGov shortly after the 2018 US
midterm elections (wave 1, November 20 to December 27, 2018, N = 4, 907;
wave 2, December 14, 2018 to January 3, 2019, N = 4, 283).‖ Respondents
were selected by YouGov’s matching and weighting algorithm to approxi-
mate the demographic and political attributes of the US population (32%
‖Respondents took the surveys in order with a delay between them averaging approx-
imately 3 wk. The dates above reflect the ranges in which all wave 1 and wave 2
responses were collected.































college graduates, 45% male, median age 50 y; 46% identify as Democrats
and 36% as Republicans). A subset of these respondents were members of
the YouGov Pulse panel and voluntarily provided behavioral data on their
online information consumption as well (see SI Appendix, section A for more
details).
US data collection was approved by the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
at the University of Michigan (HUM00153414), Washington University in St.
Louis (201806142), and Princeton University (10875). University of Exeter
accepted the University of Michigan IRB approval. All subjects gave con-
sent to participate in our study. The US study preanalysis plan is available at
https://osf.io/u3sgc.
For India, we conducted two separate two-wave panel studies, one online
and the other face to face. Both surveys were conducted in Hindi. Respon-
dents were excluded if indicated they mostly or always give humorous
or insincere answers to survey questions (which amounted to 7–8% of
responses in the online survey by wave compared to less than 1% in the
face-to-face survey; this exclusion represents a deviation from our preregis-
tration, but the results in Table 2 are robust to including these respondents).
In the online survey, we collected survey data from a national convenience
sample of Hindi-speaking Indians recruited via Mechanical Turk and the
Internet Research Bureau’s Online Bureau survey panels (wave 1, April 17 to
May 1, 2019, N = 3, 273; wave 2, May 13 to 19, 2019, N = 1, 369). The India
face-to-face survey was conducted by the polling firm Morsel in Barabanki,
Bahraich, Domariyaganj, and Shrawasti, four parliamentary constituencies
in the state of Uttar Pradesh where Hindi is the dominant language (wave
1, April 13 to May 2, 2019, N = 3, 744; wave 2, May 7 to 19, 2019, N = 2,695).
These locations were chosen, in part, due to their higher levels of religious
polarization, which we anticipated might increase demand for and belief in
online misinformation and rumors. The representative random sample for
the India face-to-face survey was drawn from the public voter registration
list for these constituencies and was administered orally by trained enumer-
ators to account for low literacy rates. Relative to the face-to-face survey,
online respondents were more likely to be male (72% versus 64%), younger
(median age 30 y versus 37 y), more educated (76% college graduates ver-
sus 6%), higher caste (42% low caste versus 74% in the face-to-face sample),
more active on social media (90% use WhatsApp versus 11%), more inter-
ested in politics (3.7 versus 2.9 on a 4-point scale), more knowledgeable
about politics (providing correct responses to an average of 2.8 vs. 2.1 of
four true–false questions about Indian politics), and slightly less likely to
support the BJP (42% versus 46%) (SI Appendix, section D, Table D1).
India data collection was approved by the IRBs at the University of
Michigan (HUM00160358), Ashoka University, and Morsel Research and
Development (HIRB000007598). University of Exeter accepted the Univer-
sity of Michigan IRB approval. All subjects gave consent to participate in our
study. The India study preanalysis plan is available at https://osf.io/97rnz.
Our study contexts can be viewed as a most-different case comparison
among democracies (55). India and the United States are broadly consid-
ered the poorest and richest countries, respectively, in terms of income per
capita among longstanding large democracies (ref. 56, p. 42). As a result,
India is likely to have lower levels of education and media literacy than
the United States, which raises questions about the efficacy of any media
intervention. The two studies we conduct within India further refine this
comparison, allowing us to evaluate the effects of the media literacy inter-
vention among both an online sample that has demographics that are more
similar to the United States and a face-to-face sample in one of the poorest
regions in India. Our study can thus provide evidence about the efficacy of
a media literacy intervention across democratic contexts that differ in levels
of income, education, and digital media use.
News Headline Rating Task. The main outcome of interest in all three sur-
veys was the perceived accuracy of mainstream and false news headlines. To
construct this measure, we asked respondents to evaluate the accuracy of
a number of headlines on a 4-point scale ranging from very accurate (4) to
not at all accurate (1). All of the headlines were published by actual news
sources or circulated on Facebook or WhatsApp within 6 mo of the respec-
tive survey, and a portion of the headlines were rated as false by at least
one third-party fact-checking organization. The order of the headlines was
randomized within wave for each respondent. All headlines are shown in SI
Appendix, section H1.
In the US survey, respondents evaluated 16 different headlines that
varied across multiple dimensions: news type (mainstream versus hyper-
partisan versus false), valence (pro-Democrat versus pro-Republican), and
prominence among mainstream sources (high versus low). We define high-
prominence mainstream sources as those that more than 4 in 10 Americans
recognize in Pew polling (57). Hyperpartisan stories are those that are tech-
nically factual but present slanted facts in a deceptive manner. We selected
these stories from hyperpartisan sources identified in prior work (58) (SI
Appendix, section H). This process resulted in 8 mainstream, 4 false, and
4 hyperpartisan headlines. In wave 1, respondents were shown 8 headlines
(a randomly selected headline from the two available for each possible com-
bination of news type, valence, and source prominence), while respondents
in wave 2 were shown all 16 headlines. Headlines were presented as they
would appear on the Facebook news feed to replicate a typical decision
environment. Specifically, respondents were shown the article previews that
are automatically generated by Facebook when a link is entered into the
news feed that featured a headline, a photo, the news source’s web domain,
and in certain cases a byline or story text snippet. Respondents were asked
to rate the accuracy of each headline.
In the India surveys, we adopted the same approach in asking respon-
dents to evaluate the accuracy of headlines that varied across several
dimensions: valence (congenial to BJP supporters versus congenial to BJP
opponents) and accuracy (true articles from mainstream sources†† versus
false articles as identified by fact checkers). Nationalism is also commonly
linked to misinformation in India (59). The issue was particularly salient
when the India surveys were conducted (a time of escalating tensions
between India and Pakistan), so we also asked respondents to rate the
accuracy of true and false headlines relevant to nationalist concerns in
the country (either India–Pakistan or Hindu–Muslim relations). Unlike the
US study (where the same headlines were used in both waves 1 and 2
to test for prior exposure effects), we used different sets of headlines in
each wave. Finally, 4 additional false headlines were included in the second
wave based on fact checks conducted between the two waves.‡‡ In total,
respondents rated 12 headlines in wave 1 (6 false and 6 true) and 16 in
wave 2 (10 false and 6 true). Respondents were presented with the headline
in text format in the online survey, while enumerators read the headlines
to respondents in the face-to-face survey. In both cases, participants were
asked to evaluate the accuracy of all headlines they were presented in
each wave.
Analysis. Our primary analyses are pooled OLS models predicting percep-
tions of headline accuracy on a four-point scale that ranges from not at
all accurate to very accurate. These models were estimated at the headline
level with fixed effects for each headline. Although we attempted to choose
stories that were balanced in their face validity, the headlines differed in
plausibility because the actual stories were not constructed by researchers.
We therefore use the fixed effects to account for baseline differences in
perceived accuracy between headlines. Because respondents rated multi-
ple headlines, we also compute cluster-robust standard errors. In addition
to the pooled OLS models, we also examine the difference in accuracy
beliefs between mainstream and false headlines at the respondent level
by calculating a respondent-level measure of the difference in mean lev-
els of perceived accuracy between mainstream and false headlines. Higher
scores on this scale indicate better ability to discern between stories of
different types.
Congeniality is a binary variable that is coded at the headline level for
partisans to indicate whether a story is consistent with a respondent’s par-
tisan leanings (e.g., a Democrat evaluating a story that is favorable to a
Democrat would take the value of 1). Uncongenial is coded as the opposite.
The baseline category is reserved for headline ratings by pure nonparti-
sans. To determine the partisanship of respondents in the US survey, we
used the standard two-question party identification battery (which includes
leaners) to classify respondents as Democrats or Republicans. Because India
has a multiparty system, we classified respondents there as BJP supporters if
they reported liking the BJP more than any other party (on a four-point
scale) and as a BJP opponent if they liked any other party more than
the BJP.
The key explanatory variable of interest is exposure to the media lit-
eracy intervention, which was adapted from an intervention deployed by
Facebook and WhatsApp around the world, including in Hindi-language
newspapers in India (see SI Appendix, section A for details and the exact
text). We randomly assigned respondents in wave 1 of the US and India
studies with probability 0.5 to be exposed to a set of tips for distinguishing
false news stories from mainstream stories. In the US survey experiment, 10
††Mainstream news sources included ZeeNews, Washington Post, National Herald India,
IndiaToday, Nikkei Asian Review, Reuters, and Bloomberg.
‡‡These additional headlines were part of a parallel study; further details are provided
in SI Appendix, section A).









































tips published by Facebook were presented verbatim in 2 groups of 3 and
one group of 4. In the India surveys, 6 tips from those published by Face-
book and WhatsApp were presented in 2 groups of 3 after being adapted
for the face-to-face format (omitting cues such as URLs that would not
be present and reducing their length when possible). The treatment was
administered before the headline rating task and respondents were asked
comprehension questions after each group of tips to determine receipt of
treatment. We calculate both ITT estimates using the full sample and the
ATT below.
For calculating the ATT, receipt of treatment is defined as answering all
comprehension questions correctly on the first try (online participants had
up to three chances to answer correctly; face-to-face respondents had one
chance). Receipt of treatment was substantially higher in the United States
(66% in the US online survey and 24% and 28%, respectively, in the India
face-to-face and online surveys). Our ATT estimates likely understate effects
for two reasons. A small fraction of respondents may be misclassified as com-
pliers because they guessed correctly on all of the comprehension checks,
which will diminish our ATT estimates relative to the true effect (although
the likelihood of such an outcome under random guessing is low relative to
the estimated compliance rates). Additionally, some respondents we classify
as receiving treatment are effectively “always takers”—people who either
saw the tips in real life or have already internalized them through frequent
experience. The intervention should have no effect on them. As such, our
ATT estimates will understate the true effect.
Data Availability. Data files and scripts necessary to replicate the results in
this article are available at the Dataverse repository: https://doi.org/10.7910/
DVN/Q5QINN.
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